Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), is a landmark case in which the United States Supreme Court held that the IRS had the authority to revoke the 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status of Bob Jones University (BJU) based on the university’s racially discriminatory practices that were contrary to public policy. According toThe Greenville News, BJU announced it would regain its 501(c)(3) status on March 1, 2017, 17 years after dropping its interracial dating and marriage ban.

背景：收入裁定71-447

A private school that does not have a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students does not qualify for exemption.

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联邦针对种族歧视的政策在许多广泛的公共利益领域都得到了很好的解决，例如，在运输，住房，就业，酒店，餐馆和剧院中。A recognition of a public interest in eliminating racial discrimination is shown in section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) of the regulations providing that the ‘promotion of social welfare’ includes activities ‘to eliminate prejudice and discrimination.’

1983年决定的摘录

Until 1970, the IRS extended tax-exempt status to Bob Jones University under § 501(c)(3). By the letter of November 30, 1970, that followed the injunction issued in Green v. Kennedy, 309 F.Supp. 1127 (DC 1970), the IRS formally notified the University of the change in IRS policy, and announced its intention to challenge the tax-exempt status of private schools practicing racial discrimination in their admissions policies.

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此后，1975年4月16日，美国国税局（IRS）通知了拟议的撤销其免税身份。1976年1月19日，美国国税局（IRS）正式撤销了大学的免税地位，自1970年12月1日起生效，即大学后第二天，该大学被正式通知IRS政策的变化。

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Therefore, a school not having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not ‘charitable’ within the common law concepts reflected in sections 170 and 501(c)(3) of the Code and in other relevant Federal statutes and accordingly does not qualify as an organization exempt from Federal income tax.
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Section 501(c)(3) therefore must be.analyzed and construed within the framework of the Internal Revenue Code and against the background of the congressional purposes. Such an examination reveals unmistakable evidence that, underlying all relevant parts of the Code, is the intent that entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting certain common law standards of charity — namely, that an institution seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public policy.

This “charitable” concept appears explicitly in § 170 of the Code. That section contains a list of organizations virtually identical to that contained in § 501(c)(3). It is apparent that Congress intended that list to have the same meaning in both sections. In § 170, Congress used the list of organizations in defining the term “charitable contributions.” On its face, therefore, § 170 reveals that Congress’ intention was to provide tax benefits to organizations serving charitable purposes. The form of § 170 simply makes plain what common sense and history tell us: in enacting both § 170 and § 501(c)(3), Congress sought to provide tax benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the development of private institutions that serve a useful public purpose or supplement or take the place of public institutions of the same kind.
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An unbroken line of cases following Brown v. Board of Education establishes beyond doubt this Court’s view that racial discrimination in education violates a most fundamental national public policy, as well as rights of individuals.
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On occasion, this Court has found certain governmental interests so compelling as to allow even regulations prohibiting religiously based conduct.
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The governmental interest at stake here is compelling. … [T]he Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education — discrimination that prevailed, with official approval, for the first 165 years of this Nation’s constitutional history. That governmental interest substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners’ exercise of their religious beliefs. The interests asserted by petitioners cannot be accommodated with that compelling governmental interest, see United States v. Lee, supra, at 259-260; and no “less restrictive means,” see Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Div., supra, at 718, are available to achieve the governmental interest.

Application Limitations

InObergefell诉Hodges（2015年），美国最高法院裁定，根据美国宪法的同性夫妇保证结婚的基本权利。这一决定提出了一个问题，即国税局现在是否拒绝基于性取向的歧视性政策（或更狭窄的政策，禁止同性婚姻的政策）是否拒绝501（c）（3）地位，因为与501不一致（c）（3）因为它与既定的公共政策相反。基于现任政府和国税局不愿领导公共政策制定的历史性，我们将在不久的将来看到这种否认是非常令人怀疑的。但是在几年内，随着法律的发展，小马丁·路德·金（Martin Luther King）的话使我们想起，the arc of the moral universe bends towards justice.

Deeper Dive

Obergefell，Bob Jones和IRS（Marcus S. Owens，Loeb＆Loeb）

Bob Jones University v. United States(Bruce R. Hopkins Nonprofit Law Center)